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NOTES
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
UNATTAINED PURPOSES, LIABILITY IN CONTRACT,
AND TAKINGS
A flood insurance program is a tool which should be used ex-
pertly or not at all. Correctly applied, it could promote wise use
of flood plains. Incorrectly applied, it could exacerbate the whole
problem of flood losses.1
Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act of 19682
which created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in an
effort to avoid or reduce the public's exposure to damages caused
by flooding3 and to discourage development in floodplains." De-
1. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITING A REPORT
BY THE TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL FLOOD CONTROL POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1966).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988).
3. "Flood" is defined as
(a) A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of
normally dry land areas from:
(1) The overflow of inland or tidal waters
(2) The unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any
source
(3) Mudslides (i.e. mudflows) which are proximately caused by flooding as
defined in paragraph (a)(2) of this definition and are akin to a river of liquid
and flowing mud of the surfaces of normally dry land areas, as when earth is
carried by a current of water and deposited along the path of the current.
(4) The collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or other body
of water as a result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of
water exceeding anticipated cyclical levels or suddenly caused by an unusually
high water level in a natural body of water, accompanied by a severe storm, or
by an unanticipated force of nature, such as flash flood or an abnormal tidal
surge, or by some similarly unusual and unforeseeable event which results in
flooding as defined m paragraph (a)(1) of this definition.
National Flood Insurance Program, 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1992).
4. A floodplain is "any land area susceptible to being inundated by water from any
source." Id. "Flood insurance is viewed both as a means of helping the individual bear more
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spite these noble missions, the NFIP has not accomplished the
goal of discouraging development in the floodplain in order to limit
private and public damages due to flooding. Certain indicators sug-
gest the NFIP has had the opposite effect of encouraging develop-
ment.5 Congress has made efforts over the years to correct the
NFIP's problems, most recently during the fall of 1992 and current
sessions.6
This Note will discuss the NFIP and its developmental history,
focusing on some of its recognized problems. It will suggest and
discuss solutions and analyze their anticipated effects and viabil-
ity This analysis will take place on two legal fronts: contract and
takings. First, this Note will discuss whether the NFIP imposes
contractual liability on participating communities. Second, it will
address takings issues relative to inverse condemnation in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council7 and the Court's trilogy of takings decisions in 1987,8 and
examines how those cases affect the current NFIP
HISTORY
The United States government's first efforts to deter damage
due to flooding, beginning in 1927, focused on the physical re-
easily the risks of flood damage to which his location often exposes him, and, equally, as a
means of discouraging unwise occupancy of flood-prone areas." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING
AND CURRENCY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., INSURANCE AND OTHER PROGRAMS FOR FINANCIAL AsSIS-
TANCE TO FLOOD VICTIMS IX (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also 42
U.S.C. § 4001(e)(2) (1988) (declaring guiding development away from flood threats as a con-
gressional purpose of the NFIP).
5. Telephone Interview with David Jansen, Marine Policy Analyst to Senator John Kerry
(Oct. 19, 1992). Since the NFIP's implementation, the number of homes in floodplains has
increased by 40%. Robert S. Capers, Great Flood, Still Unfinished, Fills Record Books,
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 6, 1993, at Al.
6. In the Fall 1992 session, a bill easily passed the House but a companion bill failed in
the Senate. Carl Hulse, Flood Aid Fund in Trouble, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 24, 1993,
at 20A. Representative Doug Bereuter and Senator John Kerry have reintroduced the legis-
lation in 1993 in a renewed effort to revise the NFIP and correct its problems. See HR 62,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1405, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
8. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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straint of floodwaters.' The government built levees, floodways,
reservoirs and other physical structures, all at great expense.'"
These efforts often succeeded only in exacerbating flood damages
elsewhere while creating a false sense of security in the protected
areas that encouraged building in the floodplain. 11 Development
typically outpaced construction of flood protection, further increas-
ing damages.'2 The government's efforts aimed at restraining the
floodwaters also destroyed or endangered valuable ecosystems. 13
President Truman proposed a national flood insurance program
first in 1951 and again in 1952, but strong congressional opposition
and insurance industry lobbying defeated both proposals. 14 In
1956, Congress adopted President Eisenhower's proposal, the Fed-
9. Saul J. Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram and the "Takings" Clause, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 334 (1990).
10. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisi-
ana, 60 TuL. L. REv. 61, 64-65 (1985).
11. Id. at 66.
Efforts at control may, in some cases, in the end produce results worse than
they were intended to cure. A levee to confine all floods would be prohibi-
tively costly. A feasible levee can confine floods of limited magnitudes, but
every so often a really big one will top it. Once topped, a levee tends to aggra-
vate and prolong inundation beyond what it would have been without the
levee.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. In response to the 1993 flooding of the Missouri and
Mississippi Rivers, the Association of State Flood Plain Managers, a national group repre-
senting state officials who deal with flood problems, reported that the flood control mea-
sures, such as dikes and dams, increased the severity of the flooding. Diane Dumanoski, The
Answer May Lie in Less Flood Control, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 1993, at 25.
12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.
13. Thirty years ago, the Army Corps of Engineers spent $32 million to straighten Flor-
ida's Kissimmee River into a canal in an effort to reduce its flooding tendency, destroying a
75-square-mile ecosystem surrounding the river. The Army now plans to spend $370 million
over the next 15 years to put the kinks back in the river to restore the flood absorbmg
ecosystem. Steve Kemper, This Beach Boy Sings a Song Developers Don't Want to Hear,
SMITHSONIAN, Oct. 1992, at 72. Along the Missouri River, prominent for its 1993 flooding,
"90 percent of the region drained by the river m 1860 was forest and wetlands, which absorb
vast amounts of rain." Keith Schneider, After Flood, 2 Towns Diverge About the Next One,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at A5. Today, "less than 10 percent is forest or wetland," having
been developed for valuable pasture and cropland. Id. "It is no accident of nature that
Illinois, Iowa and Missouri-the three states where the flood damage [from the 1993 flood-
ing of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers] has been the worst-have lost from 85 percent
to 90 percent of their wetlands." Id. For further description of the effects of man's attempts
to control flooding, see William K. Stevens, The High Risks of Denying Rivers Their Flood
Plains, N.Y. Tims, July 20, 1993, at C1.
14. Singer, supra note 9, at 334-35.
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eral Flood Insurance Act,15 but failed to fund its implementation.' 6
Congress feared that flood insurance would encourage development
in the floodplain and further increase losses.17 Ironically, the pre-
sent debacle has proven that fear to be well grounded.'
8
By the 1960's, those in the upper echelons of government had
become aware of the government's inability to physically control
flooding.'" Despite spending billions of dollars on the engineering
program, flood losses continued to increase.20 The Department of
Housing and Urban Development recommended in 1966 that Con-
gress adopt flood insurance as part of a national program for disas-
ter relief.' The proposed flood insurance program would seek to
"prevent unwise use of land where flood damages would mount
steadily and rapidly" while compensating the victims of flood
losses.22 The Department of Housing and Urban Development in-
tended flood insurance to replace monetary disaster relief in pro-
viding funds for flood damages.23 It has not achieved this goal.24
The final legislation proposed by President Johnson became the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.25 This Act mandates the
adoption and implementation of flood management measures,
thereby negating criticisms of the former unsuccessful proposals,
while also providing federally subsidized insurance to floodplain
residents. 26 The Act requires communities to adopt zoning ordi-
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2421 (1958) (all except § 2414(e) repealed in 1968).
16. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at v.
17. Houck, supra note 10, at 68.
18. Critics have characterized the NFIP as a federal subsidy that actually has contributed
to and encouraged building in flood-vulnerable areas. See Christopher B. Daly, Federal
Flood Insurance Seen by Critics As All Wet, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A3.
19. Houck, supra note 10, at 65-66. "The rising trend in total flood damages during the
same years that Federal expenditures for flood protection have been rising suggests that
flood protection works are not a complete answer to all flood problems." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 31-32.
20. Houck, supra note 10, at 65-66.
21. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 43. HUD made the recommendation pursuant to the
Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat. 1301.
22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
23. Houck, supra note 10, at 68-69.
24. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
25. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4127
(1988)); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at vii.
26. Singer, supra note 9, at 336; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4012, 4022 (1988).
730 [Vol. 35:727
1994] NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
nances in accordance with criteria designed to minimize the hazard
to new construction in the floodplain.
Since its inception, the National Flood Insurance Act has under-
gone several readjustments attempting to discourage development
in floodplains and encourage purchase of individual policies in par-
ticipating communities. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of
197328 provided for federal financial assistance for construction in
flood hazard areas contingent upon purchase of flood insurance.29
By 1979, the United States had spent another $7 billion on physi-
cal flood protection and prevention, and average annual flood
losses were estimated to approach over $3 billion.30 Burgeoning de-
velopment of highly exposed coastal barrier islands led to the with-
drawal of flood insurance availability for such development. 1 In
1986, President Reagan required that the NFIP be fully self-sup-
porting.3 2 Numerous other statutory refinements have sought to
create new incentives to encourage the purchase of flood insurance.
For example, one statute requires flood insurance before awarding
federal construction assistance in a floodplain.33 The latest attempt
at refinement, Senate Bill 2709 proposed by Senator John Kerry in
1992, failed to pass the Senate, although a companion bill in the
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4012, 4022 (1988).
28. Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (codified m scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-
4128 (1988)).
29. As one federal court noted, the Act
sought to significantly enhance the attractiveness of enrollment in the Program
through a dual scheme of sanctions against both non-participating communi-
ties, as a whole, and against flood-prone designated property located m an area
which is eligible for and participating in the Flood Insurance Program, but
which is not covered by flood insurance.
Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F Supp. 1025, 1027 (D.D.C. 1978), ajf'd
mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). This Act was amended
and is now merely a notice requirement for lenders to borrowers whose land may not be
eligible for federal disaster relief assistance. Id. at 1028 n.8.
30. Houck, supra note 10, at 66.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4028 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (disallowing new flood insurance for new
construction or substantial improvements of structures on any coastal barrier after October
1, 1983 as amended by the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 97-348, § 11, 96 Stat.
1653, 1658-59 (1982)).
32. Interview with Mark Stevens, Public Affairs Office, Federal Emergency Management
Agency (Jan. 12, 1994). President Reagan's Federal Insurance Administrator, Jeff S. Bragg,
announced this change in policy for the NFIP in 1982. The goal was achieved in 1986. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (1988); see Houck, supra note 10, at 70-71.
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House did pass.34 Efforts to refine the NFIP continue as congress-
men have resubmitted legislation to reform the NFIP during the
1993 session.3 5
WHY SUBSIDIZED INSURANCE?
Congress found that numerous factors make it "uneconomic for
the private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance avail-
able on reasonable terms and conditions."" A number of fac-
tors combine to make flood insurance economically infeasible for
private insurance companies. Flooding tends to be a low frequency
hazard resulting in high monetary losses. 7 The low frequency
makes accurate risk data extremely difficult to generate." Unlike
other types of insurance, flood insurance cannot spread the risk
over a large geographic area.3 9 Only those at the greatest risk of
flooding will purchase insurance, unlike the situation with fire or
theft insurance.40 Consequently, "expected losses arising out of a
given group of risks, plus expenses relating to those risks, exceed
the premium volume generated by policies written."'41
Congress determined that "personal hardships and economic dis-
tress which have required unforeseen disaster relief measures and
have placed an increasing burden on the Nation's resources '42
could be met better through federally subsidized insurance.4' The
NFIP seeks to generate sufficient premiums to cover its expenses
and losses as estimated using actuarial data as to floods and losses
34. Interview with David Jansen, supra note 5.
35. H.R. 62, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1405, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1988).
37. Singer, supra note 9, at 333. Generally, three events make up nearly 50% of the NFIP
insurance claims paid in a given year. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 332-33.
40. Id. at 332. Additionally, the government cannot compel homeowners to buy flood in-
surance for their protection as it can in the case of automobile insurance that is designed to
protect passengers and other third parties, not just the car owner. Id. at 328-29; see also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 47 (recognizing that many do not feel the need for flood
insurance until after the flood).
41. Singer, supra note 9, at 327. The losses are "expected" because one cannot determine
the actual losses which depend on the amount of flooding. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(1) (1988).
43. Id. § 4001(b)(2).
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gathered and analyzed to date.4 It responds to flood losses by
making affordable flood insurance available to individuals and
businesses located in floodplains and also by requiring local regula-
tion of development in high hazard areas to reduce future dam-
ages.45 Some believe that national flood insurance equitably
spreads the responsibility for taking risks and developing in the
floodplain.48
How the NFIP Works: Community Implementation
In order for its residents to purchase flood insurance, a commu-
nity must become a participant in the NFIP 47 Implementation of
the program in a community proceeds in three stages: the Applica-
tion, the Emergency Program, and the Regular Program.48 The key
components of a community's implementation are the designation
of flood-prone zones 49 and the establishment of the Base Flood
44. Id. § 4015(a)-(b).
45. Houck, supra note 10, at 64. See, e.g., William Booth, Pre-Andrew Mistakes Are Be-
ing Repeated, Grand Jury Warns, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1992, at A3. The enforcement of
adopted ordinances remains a big problem within the program. See id. Insuring adequate
and proper construction witlun the floodplain requires reliance on inspection of the con-
struction. Id. Hurricane Andrew demonstrates the actual deficiency in relying on such in-
spections. First, they are inadequately performed, if at all, before a catastrophic event. Id.
Following the event and reconstruction, the structures face similar threat for the inadequate
inspection process again fails to correct deficient construction. Id. Future damages, rather
than being lessened, are certain to remain the same if not exacerbated.
46. E.g., Clara Germain, Insurance, U.S. to Pay for Hurricane Cleanup, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MoNrrOR, Aug. 31, 1992, at 9 (citing Marc H. Rosenberg, Vice-President of the Insurance
Information Institute). The NFIP spreads the flood risk more so than disaster relief which
generally consists of providing victims with no-interest loans to rebuild. Disaster Relief Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5172(a)(1), 5184(a) (1988). Under the NFIP, money in the form of premiums
goes back into the system from those who may withdraw it should they suffer flood damage.
A catastrophic flood, though, may require even the person living high up in the mountains,
as a taxpayer, to absorb some of the loss. Should the losses exceed the amount of money
collected in premiums, the NFIP resorts to federal tax dollars. See infra notes 97-102 and
accompanying text. With the current NFIP, many property owners do not carry the insur-
ance and yet are at great risk. The risk, therefore, can hardly be considered to be spread
more evenly when taxpayers living far from a floodplain may have to make up the deficit
should a catastrophic flood deplete the NFIP's resources.
47. 44 C.FYR § 59.22 (1992).
48. See infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
49. The National Flood Insurance Act authorizes the federal government to identify and
publish information on areas of special flood hazards. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a) (1988). The Spe-
cial Flood Hazard Areas ("SFHA") define areas, within a community that are susceptible to
flooding from 100-year floods. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, MANDATORY
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Elevation."0 However, even if a community fails to complete its ap-
plication or never participates in the program, its residents still re-
main eligible for federal disaster relief. 1
The Application Stage
The Application stage begins with notification from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that all or part of the
community lies within a flood-prone area." A community then has
one year to complete the Application stage, during which it identi-
fies the flood-prone areas, prepares preliminary maps, and enacts a
basic ordinance managing development in the floodplain.5
The community must first approve a Flood Hazard Boundary
Map prepared by FEMA, giving a general outline of the flood-
plain.5 4 Areas inundated by 100-year floods are designated "Zone
A." 5 5 The community's approval of the Flood Hazard Boundary
Map merely indicates its concurrence that the areas designated
Zone A present a flood hazard.56 To protect the Zone A areas, the
community must develop a system to issue building permits for
structures in Zone A.51 If the Base Flood Elevation is known, the
building permit ordinance must require all new residential struc-
PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 7 (1989) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency considers "statistical analysis of records of river flow,
storm tides, and rainfall; information obtained through consultation with the community;
floodplain topographic surveys; and hydrologic and hydraulic analyses" in defining the ar-
eas. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 19 (1987) [hereinafter QUESTIONS]. The SFHA "may be further
subdivided into insurance risk rate zones." Id.
50. A "base flood," or "100-year flood" is a "flood having a one percent chance of being
equalled or exceeded in any given year." 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1992). "It is interesting to note
that, based on this standard, a homeowner in the floodplain with a traditional 30-year mort-
gage has a better than one-in-four chance of sustaining a 100-year flood during the term of
his or her mortgage." Singer, supra note 9, at 331 n.38; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note
4, at 3.
51. Houck, supra note 10, at 76.
52. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.2(a) (1992).
53. Id. § 59.2. Should a community fail to apply within one year, residents will not be
able to obtain federal financial assistance, such as a loan or subsidy, for construction within
the floodplain. Id. §§ 59.1, 59.2(a).
54. Houck, supra note 10, at 74.
55. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1992) (defining "area of special flood hazard").
56. Houck, supra note 10, at 74.
57. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(b) (1992).
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tures and substantial improvements to be elevated above the flood
level and all new nonresidential structures and substantial im-
provements either to be elevated or to be floodproofed to that
level. s If the Base Flood Elevation is not known, a community
must use all available information to determine or approximate the
Base Flood Elevation, 59 and construction must be "reasonably safe
from flooding."60 In addition, developers must conduct Base Flood
Elevation studies for developments exceeding five acres or fifty
lots.6l
The Emergency Program Stage
Once FEMA has approved a community's application, residents
become eligible for flood insurance in the Emergency Program.62 In
this program, the participating residents receive less insurance cov-
erage than under the Regular Program and pay a below cost pre-
mium designed to encourage involvement in the NFIP 63 Any fed-
erally insured or regulated financial institution is statutorily
mandated to require flood insurance before lending funds for con-
struction in the floodplain. 4
The Emergency Program provides FEMA time to conduct de-
tailed engineering studies of the flood zone. 5 After completion of
these studies, communities must adopt stricter ordinances for
managing development in the floodplain.66
58. Id. § 60.3(c); see also id. § 60.2 (setting forth the minimum requirements for compli-
ance with floodplain management criteria).
59. Id. § 60.3.
60. Id. § 60.3(a)(3).
61. Id. § 60.3(b)(3).
62. See td. § 59.3(b). A resident can obtain $35,000 of coverage for a single-family resi-
dence and an additional $10,000 for its contents. Higher coverage is available in Hawaii,
Alaska, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam-50,000 for a single-family residence. A small
business or nonresidential structure can be insured up to $100,000 with an additional
$100,000 for its contents. Id. § 61.6(a).
63. Houck, supra note 10, at 75.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (1988).
65. See Houck, supra note 10, at 73-74, 76-77.
66. Id. at 73-74; see 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)-(e) (1992).
1994]
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The Regular Program Stage
The community moves into the Regular Program following the
completion of its flood insurance rates study A detailed engineer-
ing study is then performed for FEMA by a private contractor.6 7
This study is the basis for the Flood Insurance Rate Map
(FIRM), 8 which indicates the flood-prone areas and applicable in-
surance rates within the community and establishes the Base
Flood Elevation.69
Upon entering the Regular Program, the insurance schedule
changes.7 0 An additional $150,000 in coverage for single-family
residences, small businesses and nonresidential structures becomes
available to policyholders, and contents coverage can be increased
by $50,000 for residences and by $200,000 for small businesses."
An adjustment of insurance premiums accompanies the increase in
available coverage.7 2 Rate assessments are based on whether struc-
tures were existing pre-FIRM or post-FIRM construction. 3 Actua-
rial rates are assessed on post-FIRM structures because these ad-
here to the high safety standards required by the Regular
Program.7 4 Subsidized rates remain for pre-FIRM structures, but
only for the amount for which they were insured under the Emer-
gency Program.7 5 Those landowners who do not obtain flood insur-
ance through the NFIP can still receive relief through the Disaster
Relief Act. 6
67. See Houck, supra note 10, at 76. The community does not qualify for flood insurance
under the regular program until it has adopted a floodplain management ordinance designed
to reduce or prevent flood-related damage. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(3) (1992). The ordi-
nance must require building above or floodproofing up to the Base Flood Elevation. Id.
§ 60.3(c).
68. Houck, supra note 10, at 76.
69. Id. at 76-77; see 44 C.F.R. § 64.3(a)(1) (1992).
70. See 44 C.F.R. § 61.6 (1992).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 59.3.
73. Id.
74. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.3 (1992); Houck, supra note 10, at 77-78. Note that "accepted
actuarial principles" are used to set "risk premium rates." 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1992).
75. 44 C.F.R. § 59.3 (1992). Any additional coverage obtained is charged at the risk pre-
mium rate. Id.
76. Houck, supra note 10, at 76.
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THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT: DISINCENTIVE TO NFIP PARTICIPATION
The Disaster Relief Act 7 7 furnishes federal aid "to provide an
orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Govern-
ment to State and local governments in carrying out their responsi-
bilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from
disasters. '7 1 Following a disaster, the President of the United
States may declare an area either a "major disaster" or an "emer-
gency," thereby releasing either federal services to respond to the
emergency or the full spectrum of federal aid to both individuals
and local governments.7 9 State and local governments may obtain
grants and loans to rebuild, restore or replace facilities and to con-
tinue governmental functions in the wake of a disaster.8 0 Relief
agencies may provide federally funded food, temporary shelter, un-
employment benefits, and housing repair and reconstruction assis-
tance to individuals.8' By providing this wealth of federal aid to
disaster victims, the Disaster Relief Act creates a loophole that ac-
tually discourages participation in the NFIP
The Disaster Relief Act requires local and state government re-
lief applicants seeking reconstruction assistance or "in lieu contri-
butions"8 2 for flood-damaged publicly-owned facilities to provide
assurance that "insurance will be obtained and maintained to
protect against future loss to such property "83 State and local gov-
ernments that previously have received aid under the Disaster Re-
lief Act cannot obtain assistance for any subsequent disasters un-
less all required insurance has been obtained and maintained. 4
The local governments also must take "appropriate action to
mitigate [natural] hazards, including safe land-use and construc-
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1988).
78. Id. § 5121(b).
79. See id. § 5122(l)-(2); see also id. §§ 5174, 5176-5179 (discussing the types of aid the
government may provide).
80. Id. §§ 5172(a)(1), 5184(a).
81. See id. §§ 5174, 5177(a), 5179.
82. Rather than restore damaged facilities, a state or local government can elect to receive
"in lieu contributions" in order "to repair, restore, or expand other selected public facilities,
to construct new facilities, or to fund hazard mitigation measures to meet a need for
governmental services and functions." Id. § 5172(c)(1).
83. Id. § 5154(a)(1).
84. Id. § 5154(b).
1994]
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tion practices." 85 The ordinances required by the NFIP should sat-
isfy this requirement.8 6 By permitting communities to obtain in-
surance and adopt safety measures after the first disaster, the
Disaster Relief Act allows local and state governments to take "one
free bite" from disaster relief funds before instituting measures to
limit subsequent losses."
Individuals, however, can obtain multiple, possibly endless, "free
bites" from the Disaster Relief Act.8 8 No provisions require indi-
viduals to obtain flood insurance prior to receiving relief following
uninsured disasters.8 9 The NFIP and Disaster Relief programs act
virtually independently of each other, instead of working together
to further mutual goals of preventing and relieving the damages
and dangers of flooding.90 Requiring NFIP participation by com-
munities before the first disaster would benefit the Treasury and
provide meaningful inducements for individuals to join the
NFIP "' The government should use a stick, not just a carrot. The
NFIP
was enacted not only because an increasing, investment in flood
control works was failing to keep America dry (and was indeed
rendering some downstream Americans wetter than before), but
85. Id. § 5176.
86. Houck, supra note 10, at 131.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 131-32.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 132. "The conclusion is inescapable that the federal government has yet to exer-
cise its authority fully, or even to the extent that a private businessman would think pru-
dent and reasonable, to effectuate the NFIP and reduce the disaster losses of individuals,
local governments, and its own treasury." Id.
,91. The Senate tried in 1974 to prohibit individuals from repeatedly taking advantage of
the Disaster Relief Act, but the bill failed despite finding that
[t]he increased Federal costs of providing disaster assistance in recent years,
especially to the private sector, has focused attention on the need for more
extensive insurance coverage against losses caused by natural hazards. It seems
reasonable to expect property owners to purchase basic protection against such
losses through any reasonably available insurance.
The bill stipulates that insurance adequate to protect against future loss
must be obtained for any disaster-damaged property which has been replaced,
restored, repaired, or constructed with Federal disaster funds. Unless such in-
surance is secured, no applicant for Federal assistance can receive aid for any
damage to his property in future major disasters.
S. REP. No. 778, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3073.
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also because the federal government was being called upon to
provide post flood relief for an increasing number of victims.
The NFIP intended to minimize these losses and diminish the
burden of disaster relief. Sadly, disaster relief shows few signs of
abating. Federal relief alone has exceeded one billion dollars for
each of the past five years.92
The lack of connection between the two programs becomes an
even more acute problem considering other facts about the dangers
of flooding. Although only seven percent of the United States lies
in the floodplain,93 nine out of ten natural disasters in the United
States that prompt presidential declarations of an emergency or
major disaster are flood-related.94 "According to the Federal
Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force, floods account
for more losses than any other natural disaster and, in most years,
the bulk of federal disaster aid goes to flood victims."9 Congress
has found "that annual losses from floods are 'increasing at an
alarming rate,' and attribute[d] this increase primarily to accelera-
tion of development and habitation of flood-prone areas."96 The
United States Water Resources Council estimates that flood losses
will increase dramatically, rising to more than $4.3 billion by the
turn of the century 91 Compelling statistical evidence indicates that
even inhabitants of flood-prone communities do not adequately ap-
preciate their flood peril.98 Of the eleven million structures at
flood-risk, flood insurance covers only 2.4 million, less than one
quarter.99 Moreover, the National Hurricane Center has warned
that the United States "faces more frequent and ferocious hurri-
canes [in] the next 25 years,"'100 further exacerbating the NFIP's
92. Houck, supra note 10, at 128.
93. Id. at 62.
94. Singer, supra note 9, at 325.
95. Dumanoski, supra note 11, at 25.
96. Singer, supra note 9, at 325-26 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a) (1982)).
97. Houck, supra note 10, at 63 n.4.
98. For instance, about 75% of California residents and businesses in ugh-risk flood
areas do not have insurance. Stephanie O'Neill, Check the Fine Print on Flood Insurance,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at K1.
99. 139 CONG. REC. S10841-02, S10858 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
Congress anticipated this problem even before it materialized. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 29, 47.
100. Janet L. Fix, Storm Swells over Floodplain, Insurance a Lifeline to Many, USA
TODAY, Sept. 10, 1992, at lB.
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problems and exposure to insolvency In the event that the Flood
Insurance Fund is depleted, the federal government will advance
funds "from appropriations in order to maintain the fund in an
operative condition adequate to meet its liabilities." 101 That fact,
in connection with the predicted increase in hurricane activity over
the next twenty-five years, places the fund in the highly precarious
position of potential insolvency and threatens all taxpayers' dol-
lars. As of May 31, 1993, the NFIP, with over $215 billion in in-
sured properties, was $18 million in the red. 10 2 The $18 million def-
icit does not include claims from the 1993 flooding of the Missouri
and Mississippi Rivers."0 3 For 1993, FEMA expects "a deficit of
more than $70 million"'1 4 and utilization of the $1 billion line of
credit available at the Treasury 105 A bad hurricane season could
aggravate the situation, resulting in $3.5 to $4 billion in NFIP
claims, an amount that would completely overwhelm the pro-
gram. 06 The NFIP would then be forced to borrow from the Trea-
sury with no real means of repaying the money 'o0 As of 1985, when
the NFIP had to become self-supporting, "Congress had forgiven
$1.2 billion in loans that the program had been unable to repay "I08
Hurricane Andrew, the fierce wind. storm of August 1992, should
serve as a wake-up call to Congress that the NFIP's problems must
be tackled immediately 109 Andrew caused only $100 million in
101. 42 U.S.C. § 4017(b)(3) (1988).
102. 139 CONG. REC. S10841-02, S10858 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
103. Id.
104. Robert Trigaux, Flood Insurance Premiums May Rise, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July
22, 1993, at IA.
105. Id.
106. Doug Bereuter, We Need to Tighten U.S. Flood Insurance, NEWSDAY, July 20, 1993,
at 75.
107. Id.
108. Cornelia Dean, Many Questioning Value of U.S. Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, July,
19, 1993, at B6.
109. Hurricanes present special difficulties for the NFIP and demonstrate the problem of
coastal development. As Hurricane Hugo helped demonstrate in 1989, "almost half of fed-
eral flood-insurance payments are for repeat claims by 3 percent of policyholders," those
living in coastal areas and at greatest risk to the expected increased hurricane activity.
Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Risky Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1992, at 79. Greater partic-
ipation in the program must be encouraged before a mere three percent of policyholders
break the NFIP's bank. Additionally, "coastal development between 1980 and 1988 alone
increased insured value along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts by an estimated 70 percent."
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flood damage, well below anticipated flood losses. 110 However, An-
drew was a dry storm with a low storm surge that managed to miss
major low-lying metropolitan areas such as New Orleans." More-
over, flood damages are much more predictable for a given area so
that those who choose to build in these areas should be expected to
assume the cost of insuring the risk at subsidized rates without a
disaster relief bailout should they choose to ignore the NFIP's
benefits.
Flood insurance seems a logical alternative to the continuation
of technical attempts to control flood damage. But the NFIP suf-
fers "a major handicap as a 'real-world' option. Flood insurance
does not produce the local profits that result from construction of
drainage and channelization works. Thus, these projects continue,
with the assistance of several agencies, at funding levels that dwarf
those of the flood insurance program. 11 2 Rather than trying to
protect the floodplains from flooding, efforts should be concen-
trated on discouraging building in the floodplain, or at least shift-
mg the risks of that building squarely upon those who choose to do
it.
Currently, banks, not state or local governments nor the NFIP,
provide the primary enforcement mechanism in the NFIP "' Bank
lending officers make credit decisions for building projects on the
basis of visual impressions from independent inspectors who are
chosen for their familiarity with the area, not on the basis of a
community's FIRM."4 Federally insured banks must require that
flood insurance be purchased for the amount of the loan or for the
maximum coverage available, whichever is less." 5 Cases have
shown, however, that banks do not control the grant of variances
that essentially render the protections of the NFIP meaningless.,,"
Also, unlike mismanagement of funds or neglect of fiduciary du-
Peter Kerr, How Big a Disaster Can Insurers Survive?, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1992, § 3, at
12.
110. Fix, supra note 100, at lB.
111. See id.
112. Houck, supra note 10, at 84-85.
113. Id. at 94 n.173.
114. Id. at 96.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (1988).
116. See United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1985)
(showing the responsibility of local and federal governments for the implementation of the
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ties, the banks' directors and officers cannot be held liable for an
improperly permitted structure that failed to satisfy NFIP require-
ments.117 The United States must still pay on claims that were in-
creased because of a failure to build above or flood-proof up to the
Base Flood Elevation."18
Further limiting the utility of banks as an enforcement tool is
the fact that communities that do not participate in the NFIP re-
main eligible for federally assisted housing financing because of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 li Congress
caved in to the prominent interests of the development community
when it authorized this funding. 12 0 "Undoubtedly, the incentives to
enter the program were weakened, and federally guaranteed money
is now behind floodplain development in exactly the fashion noted
and criticized by the several federal studies on flood disasters."'
The NFIP lacks any firm stick to ensure proper implementation
of the program by local authorities. Participating communities may
grant variances for building or modifying structures'22 in flood-
plains: These variances only exacerbate flood damages as the struc-
tures built pursuant to the variances continue to qualify for flood
insurance.'23 Following increased damages and discovery of the va-
riance problem, FEMA must pay the claims and only then remove
the community from the program. 24 As with banks, the United
program), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986); see also infra notes 132-69 and accompanying
text.
117. Interview with David Jansen, supra note 5.
118. Id.
119. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see
also Houck, supra note 10, at 72 n.57.
120. Houck, supra note 10, at 72 n.57.
121. Id.
122. 44 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1992) (providing for the grant of variances).
123. Id.
124. The NFIP first places a community that inadequately enforces floodplain manage-
ment regulations on probation for as long as one year after the community comes into com-
pliance with the NFIP regulations. Id. § 59.24(b). Should the community fail to correct the
problem, it can be suspended from the program. Id. § 59.24(c). Residents of a community
under probation, however, may continue to purchase or renew flood insurance policies. Id.
§ 59.24(b). Thus, although a community may be on probation, the NFIP will still honor the
individual policies of residents whose structures do not comply with the intent and letter of
the NFIP Probation does not control the NFIP's exposure to losses such as those sustained
in Saint Bernard Parish. See infra notes 132-69 and accompanying text (discussing Saint
Bernard Parish).
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States lacks any ability to recoup its increased insurance claim
payments. 1
2 5
The most chronic ill of the NFIP lies in the financial instability
of the Flood Insurance Fund.126 In 1968, Congress, recognizing that
the risk takers who build in the floodplains should bear some of
that risk, contemplated the use of the NFIP's premium as a means
to do just that.2 ' Again, the program became more a carrot than a
stick. Rather than deterring growth in the floodplain, developers
treated the program as a subsidy to encourage development of
shorefront property 128 Likewise, communities have viewed the
combination of flood insurance and disaster relief as an entitle-
ment rather than a privilege. 29 The current premium structure
still falls far below market rates with a high number of high-risk,
pre-FIRM structures paying too little money to cover the risk.i30
ROADBLOCKS TO IMPROVEMENT: CONTRACT LIABILITY AND
"TAKINGS" PROBLEMS
Effective solutions to the NFIP's problems involve two basic
areas: liability for its inadequately enforced provisions and stricter
controls on construction, particularly rebuilding in flood-prone and
coastal erosion areas. In order to substantially accomplish the goals
of the NFIP, Congress should encourage more participation by in-
dividuals and communities and require stricter compliance by
lenders and participants. The goal of discouraging development
has not been accomplished; instead, the NFIP arguably has at-
tained the opposite effect.' 31 While the NFIP should continue to
protect owners of existing floodplain structures, measures should
be taken to financially inhibit the construction of new buildings on
floodplains.
125. United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986). See rnfra notes 131-69 and accompanying text (discussing the
lack of a community's contractual liability to the United States government as a participant
in the NFIP).
126. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
127. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 42-43.
128. Interview with David Jansen, supra note 5; see also Daly, supra note 18, at A3.
129. Interview with David Jansen, supra note 5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Court decisions have penalized governments on the one hand for
failing to prevent floodplain development, and on the other hand
for actively controlling floodplain development. Congress must act
in order to resolve this apparent contradiction, and salvage the
NFIP It will not be easy The NFIP's problems implicate two fun-
damental areas of the law: contract law and takings law.
Is There a Contract? United States v Parish of Saint Bernard
In the Louisiana case of United States v. Parish of Saint Ber-
nard,132 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the United States could not hold participating communi-
ties contractually liable for inadequate enforcement of NFIP regu-
lations. 3 Due to heavy flooding in the Jefferson and St. Bernard
parishes in May 1978 and April 1982, the United States paid $95
million in claims and fees under policies issued pursuant to the
parishes' participation in the NFIP 134 Prompted by the losses
from the first flood in May 1978, the United States filed separate
suits against Jefferson and St. Bernard parishes with the cases be-
ing consolidated in the district court.135 The United States alleged
that the parishes
failed to establish and apply minimum building elevation levels
until three years after their deadline; failed to observe and en-
force these elevation requirements once enacted; routinely per-
mitted and granted variances, without justification, for construc-
tion below [Base Flood Elevation] (in one case, apparently,
three feet below [Base Flood Elevation]); and knowingly permit-
ted structures which were falsely certified as elevated to [Base
Flood Elevation]. [T]hey further exacerbated flood losses by
negligently approving subdivisions in flood-prone areas, utilizing
substandard fill, destroying protective levees, and failing to pro-
132. 756 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. dented, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986).
133. Id. at 1121.
134. Houck, supra note 10, at 142-43; see also United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, No.
83-3557 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, USAPP File) ("St. Bernard IF');
United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, No. 81-1808 (E.D. La. July 8, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Dist File) ("St. Bernard I").
135. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1119; see also Houck, supra note 10, at 143 n.474.
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vide adequate -drainage after specific notice from consultants
that existing systems were deficient."3 6
The United States originally brought suit for four causes of ac-
tion: tort, contract, statutory, and public nuisance. 13 7 Under the
tort claim, the Government sued as subrogee of the insured parish
residents in potential negligence claims against the parishes.3 8 The
statutory action sought an implied contract remedy for injunction
and damages.' The nuisance action sought to abate the increased
risk of flood damage that the parishes had created. 40 Most impor-
tantly, the United States sought reimbursement for increased pay-
ment of claims due to breach of contract and lack of enforcement
of the parishes' ordinances adopted pursuant to their participation
in the NFIP 'I The magistrate denied the statutorily implied right
of action and the contract claim.' 42 He ruled that neither claim
clearly existed in the National Flood Insurance Act and did not
believe that Congress intended to place ultimate financial responsi-
bility for the Program on local communities. 43 The magistrate val-
idated the actions based on statutory language and the subrogation
clauses in the policies and sustained the nuisance claim."' The
Government's damage claims were reduced to tort, and its injunc-
tive relief to nuisance. 4 5
The district court dismissed the nuisance claim for lack of stand-
ing due to the fact that no national interest was at stake. 48 It
found that subrogation did exist for the tort claim and that a con-
tract existed between the United States and the parishes. 147 How-
ever, the court separated the existence of the contract from the
136. Houck, supra note 10, at 143-44.
137. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1119.
138. St. Bernard II, slip op. at *1; see also Houck, supra note 10, at 144.
139. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1119; see also Houck, supra note 10, at 144.
140. St. Bernard II, slip op. at *1.
141. St. Bernard I, slip op. at *3.
142. Houck, supra note 10, at 144.
143. Id. The magistrate believed that the NFIP provided the federal government with a
single remedy of specific performance which could be used as an enforcement mechanism.
Id. at 145.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. St. Bernard I, slip op. at *6.
147. Id. at *24.
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remedy "I Like the magistrate, the district court also did not be-
lieve that Congress intended a remedy as extreme as money dam-
ages,'49 but held that the United States could obtain specific per-
formance and force the parishes to act within the constraints of
their ordinances. 50
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the United States pursued only
monetary damages under the contract, tort and subrogation causes
of action, and abandoned the public nuisance claim. 151 Conse-
quently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the nuisance claim. 52 The cir-
cuit court also dismissed any implied right of action under the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Act and rejected the contract claim, but
upheld the subrogation theory "'
The Fifth Circuit confronted a tough decision with the parishes
facing millions of dollars in damages versus the Government's jus-
tifiable expectation of proper and diligent implementation of the
ordinances, the failure of which resulted in the damages. Relying
on Pennhurst State Schools v. Halderman,5 4 the majority refused
to recognize the existence of a contract by a vote of two to one. In
Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that no contract liability ex-
isted if a state was unaware of the conditions in the program or
was unable to determine the Government's expectations. 55 The
148. Id. at *2. "We conclude that it was not Congress' intent to permit reimbursement
from the parishes under such circumstances. Neither Congress nor the parish governing
bodies foresaw that there would be such an extreme remedy for either a negligent or inten-
tional breach of the contract." Id. at *3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
Congress did not intend that the government should be powerless to compel
the parishes and their governing bodies to perform obligations clearly under-
taken by them as a condition precedent to the issuing of flood insurance poli-
cies to the citizens of the parishes. When local governing bodies volunta-
rily commit themselves to participation in a federal program, they cannot urge
that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the United States from compelling them
to satisfy their obligations under the contract.
Id.
151. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1119.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1128.
154. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
155. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1121. " 'There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a
state is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accord-
ingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do
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Fifth Circuit ruled that Congress failed to clarify that a commu-
nity's participation in the NFIP created a contract with potential
liability 156 A community, therefore, could not knowingly accept a
large risk of liability 157 The court focused not on the parishes' un-
derstandings of their performance expectations but on their failure
to anticipate their potential liability 158 The majority also seemed
troubled by the potentially large damage figure in the complaint of
$95 million.159
Judge Williams, writing in dissent, remained truest to contract
principles and judicial determination, avoiding the damage figure
in his consideration while expressing concern over its consideration
by the majority 160 Judge Williams found a definite quid pro quo
arrangement in which the United States agreed to provide subsi-
dized insurance to the parishes' residents in exchange for land-use
regulations. 161 He found support for finding a contract in the lan-
guage of Pennhurst, the same case that the majority relied on to
find no contract. " '[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed condi-
tions.' "1M2 According to the dissent, when Pennhurst spoke of a
party ascertaining the other's expectations, the Court did not mean
the expectations of damages or potential liability, but rather the
party's expected performance obligations. 163 "Exposure to damages
is, classically, the domain of Hadley v. Baxendale: the foreseeabil-
ity of the damages limits exposure[,]" rather than defining it. 6 4
The dissent concluded that the trial court should determine the
extent of the parishes' liability 165
so unambiguously ' " Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). It is hard to believe that
the parishes could assume that the Government would not expect proper performance under
the NFIP so as to meet the goals of the program.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1127.
159. Id. at 1121; see also Houck, supra note 10, at 149.
160. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1130 (Williams, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1129.
162. Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
163. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1129.
164. Houck, supra note 10, at 149-50 (footnote omitted).
165. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1130 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court declined to review Saint Bernard, denying
the NFIP an important stick in implementing its program and ac-
complishing its goals.' 6 6 The courts have placed squarely on Con-
gress the responsibility to provide explicitly for such liability
within the program,6 7 a measure that it has yet to pursue.
Granted, the political will required for such a measure certainly
would exceed that of any exhibited by Congress."'8 To insert such
a provision certainly would act as a great discouragement to other
communities joining the program, but with no other source of flood
protection, notwithstanding any "bites" into the Disaster Relief
Act, communities would not have other alternatives. The liability
stick becomes even more important when one realizes the inability
of FEMA to obtain a staff adequate to oversee the programs of
each of the 18,000 participating communities, 9 much less to en-
sure that each building permit issued by a community meets the
NFIP's standards and furthers the goal of preventing property
damage in the floodplain.
"Takings" Defined
Whereas cases concerning contract liability impose a require-
ment of explicit congressional action, Supreme Court decisions in
the areas of eminent domain and inverse condemnation may serve
to inhibit if not invalidate those very congressional actions. The
Supreme Court's 1987 "trilogy" of decisions 70 and its 1992 deci-
sion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'7' most promi-
nently affect ordinances implemented by communities that have
exceeded the requirements of the NFIP and banned development
altogether within the floodplain. As will be seen, these cases do not
directly impact the NFIP
166. United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986) (denying certiorari).
167. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1121.
168. Congress consistently lacks the will to balance the federal budget, a measure that no
one denies in importance and that figures frequently in any discussion of the United States
economy.
169. GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at 6.
170. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
171. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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The key issues in inverse condemnation cases involve the police
power, the ability of a government to regulate the use of, or impair
rights in, property to prevent detriment to the public interest, and
the extent to which a government can use the police power to in-
hibit individual property rights. 17 2 When a government goes too
far, a court can invalidate an ordinance or its application to a par-
ticular property as a taking of property without just compensation,
a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 173 The problems in these cases
center on where to draw the line between a taking and a justifiable
use of the police power and what test or approach to use in draw-
ing that line.1"4 One theoretical approach involves actual physical
invasion-whether a government has directly confiscated property,
transferring its ownership to the government without paying com-
pensation to the owner. 17 5 Similarly, a court may consider whether
property has been physically appropriated for governmental or
public use without transferring title.17 6 Neither test, however, af-
fects the NFIP because the program does not take land for physi-
cal use.1"7
The tort-based theory of nuisance abatement requires less than
an actual physical appropriation to find a taking, thereby reducing
the burden of a takings claimant. 17 Governments regularly depend
on nuisance abatement to uphold health and safety regulations, re-
lying on the Supreme Court's language in Mugler v. Kansas:7 9
"[A]l property in this country is held under the implied obligation
172. "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit."
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); see also Cooper v. State, 48 N.Y.S.2d 212,
214-15 (Ct. Cl. 1944) (proper exercise of police power constitutes no taking when prohibiting
further damage to water supply by runoff from neighboring barnyard waste).
173. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added).
174. See Singer, supra note 9, at 338.
175. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding
that any physical appropriation or invasion, no matter how small, constitutes a compensable
taking); see also Singer, supra note 9, at 339.
176. Singer, supra note 9, at 339.
177. Id. at 340.
178. Id. at 340-41.
179. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the commu-
nity "180 Pursuant to this approach, the issue under the NFIP is
whether individuals who do not comply with a participating com-
munity's floodplain ordinances have somehow harmed or endan-
gered the general public. Again, as first person type insurance, un-
like automobile insurance,"'1 the key to the program is to lessen
disaster relief costs-costs paid for by the general taxpayer. If a
noncompliant property owner's activities lead to increased costs,
then some harm may result to the general public as taxpayers. Ad-
ditionally, any construction that increases the flood danger to
other property owners in violation of an ordinance adopted pursu-
ant to the NFIP clearly constitutes a nuisance.
Two other theoretical approaches to determine whether a state's
action constitutes a taking involve an ordinance's effect on a prop-
erty's value. The first involves balancing the economic burden on
the landowner due to the regulation against the regulation's benefit
to the public.182 If the benefit does not outweigh the burden, then
the regulation constitutes a taking.18 The other approach involves
measuring the regulation's diminution in the property's value or
use.18 4 Under this approach, a taking consists of depriving a land-
owner of all or most of his interest in or use of the property 185 A
property owner, however, is not guaranteed the most profitable use
of his property though he may expect a reasonable return on his
180. Id. at 665. The concern in nuisance cases involves the innocent landowner who pur-
chased the property before the ordinance was passed with the plans to build in a lawful and
inoffensive manner. The regulation suddenly makes that individual a wrongdoer and penal-
izes him by not allowing him to act on his prior expectations. Drawing the takings line with
respect to the nuisance line can be arbitrary. Singer, supra note 9, at 342.
181. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
182. "[I]n instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health,
safety, morals or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated
uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected
recognized real property interests." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 125 (1978); see also Singer, supra note 9, at 342.
183. Singer, supra note 9, at 342.
184. Id. at 343. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
492-93 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
185. Singer, supra note 9, at 343. See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 (finding no taking
because the regulation did not make plaintiff's venture commercially impraticable); Penn-
sylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (finding a taking because the regulation destroyed the plain-
tiff's ability profitably to use the property).
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investment.186 The Supreme Court has scrutinized each of these
approaches to takings disputes.
The Trilogy Cases
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
The first of the trilogy cases, Keystone,8 7 focused on the Penn-
sylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act.'88 The Act required an owner of mining rights to leave behind
fifty percent of the coal to support the land above it should that
land have public or private structures built upon it, in order to
prevent that land from subsiding or collapsing.'89 The Court ap-
plied a two-prong test to determine whether the regulation consti-
tuted a taking: (1) whether the statute " 'does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests,' "90 a police power analysis, or
(2) whether the statute " 'denies an owner economically viable use
of his land,' " a diminution in value analysis.' 9'
The Act affected only about two percent of the plaintiff's total
property, but plaintiff contended that the regulation deprived him
of fifty percent of the value of the regulated area. 92 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, taking a holistic approach to the reg-
ulation's effect. 93 The Court believed that if it looked at the fifty
percent not mined as a whole rather than a small part of a whole,
then even setbacks in zoning regulations would result in a tak-
ing.9 The Court looked at the value of what the government had
186. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137.
187. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
188. See id. at 474 (construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1 et seq. (1986)).
189. Id. at 476.
190. Id. at 485 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 498.
193. Id. at 498-99.
194. Id. at 498. The Court stated:
The 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property
for takings law purposes. Many zoning ordinances place limits on the property
owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property. A re-
quirement that a building occupy no more than a specified percentage of the
lot on which it is located could be characterized as a taking of the vacant area
as readily as the requirement that coal pillars be left in place. Similarly, under
petitioner's theory one could always argue that a setback ordinance requiring
that no structure be built within a certain distance from the property line con-
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taken versus what the owner retained,9 5 but also stressed that
when a regulation enjoins a nuisance or public harm, no taking
exists. 196
Keystone presented the classic facial challenge to a regulation,
wherein the plaintiff asserted that the mere enactment of the
Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conserva-
tion Act constituted a taking. 9 7 Facial challenges are difficult to
argue and are rarely successful.9 8 "When the Court is convinced
that a legislative enactment is intended to protect a defendant
against a destructive plaintiff, the Court will grant considerable
breadth of discretion to the government, broadly interpret the ra-
tionality requirement, and generally uphold governmental
regulation."'99
The NFIP itself survived a facial attack in Texas Landowners
Rights Association v. Harris.00 Keystone figured prominently in
the court's evaluation of whether a participating community's
floodplain management regulations may constitute a taking. In
April v. City of Broken Arrow,21' a landowner claimed that a city
ordinance adopted in compliance with the NFIP2 °2 completely de-
nied him beneficial use of his property, property that he wished to
stitutes a taking because the footage represents a distinct segment of property
for takings law purposes.
Id. Similarly, if the Court adopted the plaintiff's theory, under the NFIP, prohibition of
post-FIRM building construction below Base Flood Elevation would be a taking. Singer,
supra note 9, at 358.
195. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
196. Id. at 491. The Court noted:
The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the
simple theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to
create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not "taken" anything
when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.
Id. at 491 n.20.
197. Id. at 474.
198. The Court in Keystone classified facial challenges as a "heavy burden" and an "up-
hill battle." Id. at 493, 495. Some commentators even claim facial constitutional attacks are
"'a waste of time and money.' " Singer, supra note 9, at 359 (quoting ARDEN H. RATHKOPF
& DAREN A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 7.07, at 7-59 (1986)).
199. Singer, supra note 9, at 360.
200. 453 F Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that a community's compliance with the
NFIP did not result in a taking without just compensation), aff'd, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); see infra note 268 and accompanying text.
201. 775 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1989).
202. Id. at 1352.
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develop but which lay within the 100-year floodplain.03 The ordi-
nance allowed for only "flood tolerant uses," such as a recreation
park, nursery, or drive-in theatre.204 Relying on Keystone, the
court held that the landowner's "potential use of all property
is subordinate to the right of City's reasonable ordinances
that are clearly necessary and bear a rational relation to preserving
the health, safety, and general welfare of the residents of Broken
Arrow."20 5 The NFIP and ordinances adopted as part of the pro-
gram would pass constitutional scrutiny under Keystone. 6
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles
The second case in the trilogy, First English,207 focused on a
floodplain regulation in the form of an interim ordinance adopted
by Los Angeles County prohibiting the construction or reconstruc-
tion of any building in a floodplain. 08 The church claimed that the
ordinance denied it all use of its property located within the flood-
plain.20 9 The Supreme Court, however, did not review whether the
ordinance constituted a taking entitling the church to compensa-
tion.210 The Court instead focused on whether temporary takings
required compensation and remanded the case for determination
of the takings issue. 11 The Court did offer guidance to the lower
203. Id. at 1350.
204. Id. at 1349 n.5.
205. Id. at 1352-53.
206. For a discussion of the effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992), on this analysis, see infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
207. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
208. Id. at 304.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 312-13.
211. ,Id. at 322. In making its decision, the Supreme Court treated as true the plaintiff's
allegation that it had been denied "all use of its property." Id. at 321 (emphasis added). On
remand, the California Court of Appeal did not find a taking, recognizing the ordinance as a
valid exercise of the police power. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 906 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
Likewise, the church was not denied all use of its property under the holistic approach used
in Keystone, for eight of its total 21 acres were unaffected by the ordinance. Id. at 903. The
court also believed that the plaintiff was burdened by, as well as benefited from, the legisla-
tion: "First English enjoys the safety benefits accompanying the prohibition of construction
on the other properties along the riverbed in return for the 'reciprocal' safety benefits that
flow to the other landowners because First English is subject to a similar ban." Id. at 905.
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court for use in its determination. To prove a taking has occurred,
the plaintiff must show by a preponderance that the regulation de-
prived it of all use of its property-that the only possible use for
the land required reconstruction of the previous improvements.212
In the past, courts have found sufficient value to repeal a takings
claim in nondevelopmental uses of floodplain property such as rec-
reational and agricultural uses.21 3 The mere deprivation of the
most profitable use does not qualify as a taking.214
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
The final case in the trilogy, Nollan,1 5 marked a change in the
Supreme Court's consideration of takings. In Keystone and First
English, the Court focused on economic issues. In Nollan, the
Court adopted a nexus test requiring that when a government
agency issues a building permit subject to an affirmative condition,
the condition must bear a substantial relationship to the goals the
government seeks to attain.216 The plaintiff in Nollan wished to
demolish an existing beachfront bungalow and build in its place a
larger home.21 Such construction required a permit from the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission.218 In return for granting the permit,
the Commission required the landowner to allow the public an
easement to traverse the landowner's beach.21 The Commission
justified the condition as a way to offset the visual burden of the
landowner's proposed home.220 It maintained that the new home
would constitute a psychological as well as a physical barrier which
212. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
213. See Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (Ct. App. 1972) (upholding
development ban within floodplain that allowed agricultural and recreational uses); Turn-
pike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 895-96 (Mass. 1972) (upholding regula-
tion because it allowed agricultural and recreational uses), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108
(1973); Usdin v. Department of Environmental Protection, 414 A.2d 280, 290 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1980) (upholding ban on all development within the floodplain because it pre-
vented harm to persons), aff'd, 430 A.2d 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). The analysis
may change after Lucas. See infra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
214. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
215. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
216. Id. at 837, 841.
217. Id. at 828.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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would prevent the public from "realizing [that] a stretch of coast-
line exists nearby -1221
The Supreme Court held that the condition requiring an ease-
ment failed to advance the Commission's justification for the ease-
ment.222 Consequently, "if [the Commission] want[ed] an easement
across the Nollans' property, it [had to] pay for it. ' 223 To enact a
particular land-use regulation under the guise of its police powers,
a government must show that a prohibited land use furthers the
justification given for its enactment.224
This trilogy of cases leaves the landowner with two avenues by
which to challenge a land-use regulation or its application to his
property- (1) the economic impact test when the regulation leaves
no viable use,225 or (2) the public purpose test, wherein a statute
fails to further a legitimate governmental purpose or lacks a close
nexus between the means and ends.226 To prevent the finding of a
taking, the government must show that the regulation bears a close
fit to its purpose or that the landowner -etains some viable use of
his property
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
The Supreme Court's most recent inverse condemnation deci-
Sion, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,227 indicates yet an-
other change in the methods of determining takings cases. As seen
in Keystone, facial challenges to a regulation often fail except in
the most egregious situations. 228 "As applied" challenges to a regu-
lation, focusing on the regulation's effect upon the plaintiff's prop-
erty, have greater success, but each case requires an independent
221. Id.
222. Id. at 837.
223. Id. at 842.
224. See id. at 837.
225. See discussion of Keystone and First English, supra notes 187-215 and accompany-
ing text.
226. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837, 841; see also Singer, supra note 9, at 367-68.
227. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
228. See Mattoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1980) (invalidating an ordi-
nance that designated the plaintiff's property a floodway to avoid the expense of adequately
maintaining the city's drainage system); Allingham v. City of Seattle, 749 P.2d 160,
amended, 757 P.2d 533 (Wash. 1988) (invalidating an ordinance that required landowners to
reserve 50% to 70% of their land for a greenbelt preserve).
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analysis of the regulation's effects on the individual property using
the various takings tests.229 Had the plaintiff in Keystone owned
mining rights that were affected in their entirety by the Pennsylva-
nia Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, thus
depriving him of fifty percent of his property rather than just one
percent,30 the Court may have come to a different conclusion and
found a taking.231 Lucas finds the Supreme Court, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Scalia, trying to fashion a more gener-
ally applicable test in an effort to move away from the case-by-case
determination of "as applied" cases.
232
The plaintiff in Lucas purchased two coastal lots in 1986 for
$975,000.233 In 1988, the South Carolina legislature passed the
South Carolina Beachfront Management Act without a variance
provision.2 34 The Act prohibits construction of habitable structures
between the ocean and a "baseline" that connects "the landward-
most 'point[s] of erosion during the past forty years.' "23" The
plaintiff's lots rested entirely within the prohibited area.23 6 The
Act protects the South Carolina coastline from further develop-
ment, thus allowing the natural processes of and protection pro-
vided by sand dunes to continue without inhibition.3 7 The legisla-
229. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-95
(1987).
230. Fifty percent of the two percent of the coal that was actually affected equals one
percent. Id. at 498; see supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
231. The Court would then have been considering the "whole" rather than "part of the
whole." See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Justice Scalia has not
accepted the part of the whole versus the whole of a part distinction as having precedential
value. He believes that the issue remains unsettled despite Keystone. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2894 n.7 (Scalia, J.).
232. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2888.
233. Id. at 2889.
234. Id., see also td. at 2907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). South Carolina added a variance
provision in 1990. Id. at 2890-91. The NFIP provides for a variance. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, The NFIP's variance takes into consideration the land-
owner's problem in Lucas. A variance may be issued for new construction when the new
structure is "surrounded by lots with existing structures constructed below base flood level."
44 C.F.R. § 60.6(a)(2) (1992). The lot owner must still satisfy exceptional hardship require-
ments. Id.
235. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 (alterations in original) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-
280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2905. "The Beachfront Management Act includes a finding by the South Caro-
lina General Assembly that the beach/dune system serves the purpose of 'protect[ing] life
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ture had determined that development of the dunes increased
erosion and caused injury to the general public welfare. 28 The Act,
though not allowing any further structural development of the
coastline, did allow for other uses and development, such as
wooden walkways or golf courses. 3 9
The state trial court found for plaintiff, holding that the lots re-
tained no viable use under the construction ban, and awarded com-
pensation.140 The South Carolina Supreme Court found no taking
and reversed the trial court.2 4' It held that the South Carolina leg-
islature had acted within its police power to prevent nuisances, re-
lying on precedent to prevent noxious uses.2 42
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the South
Carolina Supreme Court's decision and its reliance on the noxious
use cases.243 Instead, the Court focused on the property owner's
and property by serving as a storm barrier which dissipates wave energy and contributes to
shoreline stability in an economical and effective manner.' "Id. at 2905-06 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(1)(a) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990)). In terms of economy, the community of Folly Beach, South Carolina plans to
spend $16 million, 85% of it federal money, to renourish its beach and recreate a 150 foot
beach at high tide that was lost to erosion, an expenditure that the Beachfront Management
Act seeks to prevent. See Peter Applebome, Hugo's 3-Year Wake: Lessons of a Hurricane,
N.Y. TihEs, Sept. 18, 1992, at Al.
238. " 'This type of development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune system,
accelerating erosion, and endangered adjacent property.' "Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2906 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
239. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Petitioner can picnic, swim, camp in a tent,
or live on the property in a movable trailer" and most importantly, exclude others from it.
Id.
240. Id. at 2890.
241. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
242. Id. at 900; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding
a prohibition against gravel excavation below the water table); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928) (finding that a Virginia statute requiring the destruction of the plaintiff's cedar
trees in order to protect apple orchards important to the state economy did not constitute a
taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting
the manufacture of bricks within the city limits of Los Angeles did not constitute a taking);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the further oper-
ation of breweries because the county was declaring itself dry).
243. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. " 'Harmful or noxious use' analysis was simply the
progenitor of our more contemporary statements that 'land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests."'" Id. (quoting Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834).
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expectations244 and did not defer to the legislature's findings and
purposes. 4 5 The Court refused to recognize the distinction be-
tween preventing harm to the public and providing a public benefit
at the expense of the individual.246 The antagonism to that distinc-
tion primarily endangers prior precedent involving floodplain
regulation.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens penned strong dissents. Neither
found the case ripe for decision because the plaintiff had not filed
for and been denied a building permit under the Act.24 Both dis-
sents found the majority's determination disturbing.2"  Justice
Blackmun agreed with the South Carolina Supreme Court's hold-
ing that no taking existed and the lower court's deference to the
factual determinations of the South Carolina legislature in drafting
the Act.249 He was disturbed by the majority's "willingness to dis-
244. Id. at 2899. "Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antece-
dent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with." Id. "Any limitation so severe cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the re-
strictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership." Id. at 2900. Justice Scalia's strong concerns for the landowner
are evidenced further by his word choices, such as referring to the Beachfront Management
Act as having brought "Lucas's plans to an abrupt end." Id. at 2889 (emphasis added).
245. The majority dismissed the legislature's findings when it dismissed the continued use
of the harmful or noxious use rationale. See id. at 2896-99.
246. Id. at 2899.
When it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was merely our
early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without
compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction be-
tween regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers bene-
fits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it
becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to
distinguish regulatory "takings"-which require compensation-from regula-
tory deprivations that do not require compensation.
Id. at 2898-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. "Clearly, the Court was eager to decide this case. But eagerness, in the absence of
proper jurisdiction, must-and in this case should have been-met with restraint." Id. at
2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found the majority acted "[c]avalierly [in]
dismissing the doctrine of judicial restraint" and proceeding to decide the issue. Id. at 2918
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, in a separate statement would have dismissed the
writ of certiorari entirely. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., separate statement). He found the issue of
total deprivation of the parcel's value to be an "unreviewable assumption" and thus felt it
imprudent to proceed on the merits of the case. Id.
249. Id. at 2906 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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pense with precedent" 250 and to shift the burden of proof in such
cases from the property owner to the State.251 The landowner pre-
viously had to demonstrate that the ordinance constituted a tak-
ing.252 The Court also required the State to prove its justifications
for the Act.253 Justice Blackmun expressed dismay over this
change, particularly in light of having most recently "reaffirmed
that claimants have the burden of showing a state law constitutes a
taking. '2
54
Justice Stevens expressed concern over the Court's attempt to
fashion a general rule for takings, particularly in light of the long
history of precedent supporting the view that such a rule is not
possible in takings situations. 55 He also challenged the general
rule's potential for arbitrary decisions. 56 Where one who has lost
one hundred percent of use receives full compensation, one who
has lost only ninety-five percent does not.257
The general rule in Lucas, that a total deprivation of viable use
constitutes a taking, appears to work favorably with land-use regu-
lations. As long as the regulation allows for some continued use,
the government need not pay compensation. This bright-line rule
is not helpful, though, in considering prior determinations of viable
250. Id. at 2909.
251. Id.
252. Id. "[T]his Court always has required plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of
an ordinance to provide 'some factual foundation of record' that contravenes the legislative
findings." Id. (quoting O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins., 282 U.S. 251, 258
(1931)).
253. Id.
254. Id. (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485). "In this case, apparently, the State now has
the burden of showing the regulation is not a taking. The Court offers no justification for its
sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could." Id.
255. Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 2919.
257. Id.
The Beachfront Management Act not only prohibited the building of new
dwellings m certain areas, it also prohibited the rebuilding of houses that were
"destroyed beyond repair by natural causes or by fire." Thus, if the homes
adjacent to Lucas' lot were destroyed by a hurricane one day after the Act took
effect, the owners would not be able to rebuild, nor would they be assured
recovery. Under the Court's categorical approach, Lucas (who has lost the op-
portunity to build) recovers, while his neighbors (who have lost both the op-
portunity to build and their homes) do not recover. The arbitrariness of such a
rule is palpable.
Id. (citations omitted).
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use, such as agricultural or recreational uses. The Supreme Court
in Lucas appears to accept only structural improvements as viable
uses. Although the majority denies this contention,25 s it fails to de-
scribe any other uses that satisfy viable use. Instead, the majority
seeks support for its theory in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp.,259 a physical invasion case that involved an inter-
ference with a landowner's right to exclude others, not his right to
realize a viable, nonstructural use. The Court avoided directly ad-
dressing what nondevelopmental uses it considers viable. Interest-
ingly, the Court previously spoke on this issue in Keystone: "While
the Court has almost invariably found that the permanent physical
occupation of property constitutes a taking, the Court has re-
peatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely affect real
property interests. '26 0 One may wonder, then, whether the major-
ity in Lucas meant to fashion a general rule defining viable use as
only developmental use. If not, then one returns to a case-by-case
analysis of what uses remain that may be considered viable,
thereby defeating the formulation of a general rule.
Lucas creates another tension in takings. As a facial challenge, it
does not affect the Supreme Court's "as applied" decisions in First
English and Nollan. Its effect on the application of Keystone, a
facial challenge, is unclear. Lucas does not overrule Keystone, but
the majority makes little use of Keystone as support in its analysis.
Justice Scalia cites Keystone only once in the text of the opinion,
using it as authority for a taking when a regulation "denies all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of land. 261 The only other
two cites recognizing Keystone as precedent occur in footnotes.262
One might wonder whether the majority's avoidance of Keystone is
an acknowledgement that Keystone weakens the Lucas argument
or, more importantly, whether it is a disregard for precedent. The
Court previously exhibited such disregard when it ignored the nox-
258. Id. at 2895 n.8.
259. 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
260. Keystone, 480 U.S. 470, 489 n.18 (citation omitted).
261. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
262. Id. at 2893 n.6, 2894 n.7.
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ious use cases.2 63 Justice Stevens identified this concern, calling for
"[p]roper respect for our precedents. 264
The South Carolina Supreme Court showed respect for prece-
dent. It relied repeatedly on Keystone, even stating that the deci-
sion to find no taking was " 'straightforward' because, in the final
analysis, Lucas' position , is the position of the dissent in
[Keystone]. 266 Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court
failed even to contrast why it could find a taking in Lucas but not
in Keystone. Consequently, it is not clear which case controls an
analysis of the NFIP Lucas poses the greatest threat to prior chal-
lenges to a community's floodplain ordinances, particularly those
that deny all structural improvement in the floodplain.
Takings and the NFIP
The effect of these cases on the NFIP involves three different
questions: (1) how they affect the current NFIP, (2) how they
would affect the proposed changes in the NFIP, and (3) how they
affect specific court determinations of a community's floodplain
regulations.
The trilogy cases have little effect on the current NFIP 266 The
Program does not deny a landowner any use of his property in
communities that do not participate. In those communities that do
and have enacted building ordinances, the landowner has not been
denied the ability to build; he must prove only that the project
meets certain structural conditions, i.e., that it is built above or
flood-proofed up to Base Flood Elevation. Lucas likewise has no
effect on the current NFIP because the landowner is not prohib-
ited from building, and he still retains structural use of the
property 267
263. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
264. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991) (emphasis
added), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
266. See Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that neither First English nor Nollan disturb the court's validation of the NFIP in
Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), afl'd, 598 F.2d
311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979)).
267. It should be noted that the NFIP sustained a facial attack in Hams, 453 F Supp.
1025. The plaintiff had argued that due to NFIP sanctions against "individual property
owners or entire local communities, respectively, for non-participation in the Program, the
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Proposed changes in the NFIP would run into problems mainly
in the area of a denial of funds to rebuild in erosion risk areas. The
denial of disaster relief for flood damage and stronger incentives to
purchase flood insurance do not deny the landowner the use of his
property These methods merely require the landowner to bear the
full risk of damage should her property be damaged without flood
insurance. The cases, particularly Lucas, do not prohibit disallow-
ing further development in the floodplain, for the NFIP, even with
the proposed changes, merely discourages such development.
Denial of rebuilding permits, particularly in erosion risk areas,
appears permissible. 6 8 Forced relocation of properties may enter
the Lucas realm and constitute a taking, even with federal assis-
tance for relocation. The landowner would be denied all use of his
property in exchange for, more than likely, a less than desirable
piece of property 269 However, the closer the imminent threat of
loss of the structure from flood-induced erosion, the less likely it is
that the landowner would claim a taking. Either the landowner
gives up the property to the government in exchange for reloca-
tion, or he gives it up to nature in exchange for nothing.
The greatest takings concern for floodplain ordinances lies in al-
ready adopted ordinances that provide only for nonstructural or
nonhabitable uses of property in the floodplain. Here, Lucas may
effectuate the greatest change to floodplain management. A num-
ber of cases have been litigated in this area.27 ° Courts have found
value of their land is so drastically diminished that a 'taking' must be found." Id. at 1031.
"As a matter of policy the [Supreme] Court has been reluctant to find governmental takings
where the action challenged is shown to be related to a legitimate public interest." Id. at
1032. The Lucas Court may agree with the decision but not the reasoning and the reliance
on the noxious use cases.
268. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
269. To relocate a house threatened by erosion, such as a waterfront property, one would
have to move it behind those properties developed just behind the threatened house.
270. See, e.g., Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Ct. App. 1972) (denying
a takings claim by a developer who subdivided land before the ordinance providing for only
agricultural and recreational uses in the floodplain went into effect); Turnpike Realty Co. v.
Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972) (finding no taking though the floodplain
ordinance only allowed such uses as for woodland, grassland, agricultural or recreational),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of Utica, 394 N.Y.S.2d 913
(App. Div. 1977) (denying takings claim when ordinance allowed only agricultural and recre-
ational uses of land in the floodplain), afl'd, 380 N.E.2d 328 (1978); April v. City of Broken
Arrow, 775 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1989) (denying plaintiff's takings claim that a floodplain ordi-
nance allowing only nonhabitable uses rendered his property worthless). Interestingly, in
[Vol. 35:727
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
no taking, relying often on the noxious use cases271 and most re-
cently on Keystone and First English.2
The Lucas majority's strong indication that only structural use
constitutes viable use threatens the continued validity of these or-
dinances. Consequently, a community's ability to restrict develop-
ment and subsequent damage in the floodplain, regardless of
whether they participate in the NFIP or not, has been greatly
hampered. Lucas encourages further development in the floodplain
and thus increases the government's financial exposure, either
through disaster relief or claims paid under the NFIP
CONCLUSION
Despite the effects of Lucas, other measures exist to improve the
NFIP and limit the government's and taxpayers' exposure. A first
step involves eliminating the inconsistency between the Disaster
Relief Act and the NFIP. The one free bite from disaster relief
funds for state and local governments and the unlimited bites for
individuals should be eliminated.273 Communities, governments
and individuals should be left with only the opportunity to receive
aid for flood losses though claim payments. As their only resort for
financial assistance in a flood, refusal to participate in the NFIP or
to purchase flood insurance policies would be unthinkable. This
constitutes a very heavy stick, but it only places the risks of con-
struction alongside the benefits. Alternatively, the one free bite
rule could be allowed to continue, but the limit should be extended
to individual property owners also. Repair and reconstruction
could only occur through the use of disaster relief funds with guar-
anteed and enforced participation in the NFIP by all. After that,
repair and reconstruction would be undertaken through claim pay-
ments, or, if having failed to purchase insurance, through state or
local tax dollars for governments and private funds for individuals.
April v. City of Broken Arrow, the court ultimately refused to decide the issue because the
plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, unlike in Lucas where the plaintiff
had not even applied for, much less been denied, a building permit. April, 775 P.2d at 1355.
271. See supra notes 180, 182 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., April, 775 P.2d at 1351 n.11, 1352 n.18 (citing First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)); id. at 1353 n.21 (citing
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)).
273. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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With the removal of all bites or even while allowing just one,
enforcement remains critical. As experience has shown, local gov-
ernments7 4 and banks 27 5 have not taken their responsibilities seri-
ously in ensuring compliance with the NFIP The threat of liability
for such failure tends to be a high motivating force in any situa-
tion. Currently, the United States has no avenue to impose legal
liability against local governments. In return for the privilege of
guaranteeing loans and insuring public and private properties,
banks and state or local governments should bear the burden of
enforcing the program or bear the consequences of the failure to do
SO.
The only enforcement mechanism in the NFIP is its ability to
suspend localities from the program for failure "to adequately en-
force its flood plain management regulations. 27 6 Such deficiencies
often will not come to the attention of FEMA until after a flood
has severely damaged a community because of the community's
failure properly to participate in the program. One option is for
FEMA to employ inspectors, a costly enterprise considering there
are approximately 18,000 communities in the program. The task of
reviewing all permits would be extremely burdensome. Self-polic-
ing by the community itself is a much more effective and efficient
procedure, strengthened by the imposition of liability upon the
community or the power to refuse claim payments should the com-
munity fail to properly operate under the NFIP as the communi-
ties did in Saint Bernard Parish. This method places pressure
upon both the residents of the community and upon its govern-
ment to enforce the program.
Lastly, storm-related erosion, generally or most evidently a
coastal phenomenon, requires additional procedures. For struc-
tures lost to such erosion, flood insurance under the NFIP should
be denied, thereby discouraging redevelopment of a particular
flood threat that involves ongoing transition. For threatened struc-
tures, federal assistance should be available under the NFIP for
relocation of the structures before storm-related erosion actually
274. United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1070 (1986).
275. Interview with David Jansen, supra note 5.
276. National Flood Insurance Program, 44 C.F.R. § 59.24(c) (1992).
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destroys the property 27 Little difference exists between paying a
claim for a destroyed structure and paying for its relocation before
such destruction.
A recent bill2 that would have implemented some of the
changes mentioned above failed to pass in the Senate after running
into stiff opposition from the development industry 19 The bill
sought to increase the pressure on regulated banks to make certain
that insurance policies are purchased and maintained on homes fi-
nanced through the banks. s0 Although the bill would only imple-
ment minor changes, incrementally increasing the size of the gov-
ernment's stick, it is a start. Greater measures are needed to
protect not only the NFIP but also the people and property that
the NFIP insures. Otherwise, with greater storms predicted on the
horizon, the greatest incentive to amend the program, a cata-
strophic flood, may soon arrive with disastrous consequences for
both taxpayers and the NFIP 281
Charles T Griffith
277. Relocation or buy-out efforts should also be strengthened to prevent continued re-
peat claims in noncoastal floodplains as well. For instance, Louis Hazelwood of Kempsville,
Illinois has collected more than $250,000 m flood payments over the years, not including his
claim for 1993 flooding of the Missouri River. Schneider, supra note 13, at A5. He asserts
that he has "offered repeatedly to sell the business to the Government for $125,000," but
without success. Id.
278. S. 2907, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
279. Beth Millemann, Flood Insurance Only Adds to the Cost of Hurricanes, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Aug. 31, 1992, at 12A.
280. S. 2907, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 122-125, 141 (1992).
281. The claims following the 1993 flooding of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, as of
the writing of this Note, have not been fully assessed. FEMA officials have calculated that
over 45,000 policyholders live in counties that were declared major disaster areas. Hulse,
supra note 6, at 20A.
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